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Caroline Hatton 
Property, Law and Society 
April 20, 2013 
 
Louboutin’s Red Sole Mark: A Step toward Tertiary Meaning 
 
“[F]ashion is the fashion.”1 
 
I. Introduction 
Louis Armstrong’s wonderful world contains “trees of green . . . red roses, too.”2  The 
wonderful world of trademark law contains its own rainbow—a rainbow of attributed colors3—
and that rainbow just got one red wider, if certain conditions are met:  In September, the Second 
Circuit upheld Christian Louboutin’s trademark protection for the red-lacquered soles4 that make 
J-Lo sing,
5
 that have popularized red paint,
6
 and that constitute the totemic center of the shoe-
based religion he preaches.
7
  To the extent that the soles’ redness contrasts with the rest of the 
shoe, the soles have secondary meaning—“these are Louboutins”—and are thus protectable.8 
                                                            
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING act 3, sc. 3. 
2  LOUIS ARMSTRONG, WHAT A WONDERFUL WORLD (ABC Records 1967). 
3  To name but a few examples:  Tiffany blue, UPS Brown, Owens-Corning Pink.  See Ashby Jones, The Red-Sole 
Case, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203718504577181360914355808.html; see also infra app. at 
Figure 1. 
4 See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
5 JENNIFER LOPEZ, LOUBOUTINS (Epic 2009).  Apparently, Louboutin is a fan of the song—and of the fact that 
Lopez pronounced his name correctly.  See Sarah Karmali, Christian Louboutin loves J-Lo's new single... 
Louboutins!, MARIE CLAIRE (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.marieclaire.co.uk/news/fashion/433382/christian-louboutin-
loves-j-lo-s-new-single-louboutins.html#beGotDKEtbWeDtSe.99.  
6 Cash-strapped Women are Painting Their Shoe Soles Red to Get the Louboutin Look for Less, TELEGRAPH (July 
10, 2012), http://fashion.telegraph.co.uk/news-features/TMG9389255/Cash-strapped-women-are-painting-their-
shoe-soles-red-to-get-the-Louboutin-look-for-less.html.  
7 Louboutin has been outspoken about the significance of the shoes he creates.  Some highlights include the notions 
that “comfy” is a dirty word (“I hate the whole concept of comfort!  You’re abandoning a lot of ideas when you are 
too into comfort.  ‘Comfy’—that’s one of the worst words!  I just picture a woman feeling bad, with a big bottle of 
alcohol, really puffy.”); that men can’t resist women who wear his shoes (“‘Men are like bulls,’ Louboutin said. 
‘They cannot resist the red sole.’”); that “shoes are like books, or workouts:  if they doesn’t demand anything of you, 
you’re not going to get a lot out of them;” that feet are “lucky” (“‘The foot has this lucky thing. . . .  A lot of women 
don’t like when they’re sort of fat, but a fat foot is as beautiful as a skinny foot.  Think of Greek statues.  Look how 
many people love the foot of the baby!  There is something super-charming about the baby foot.”); that shoes should 
mold the body, not vice-versa (“His best shoes are almost prosthetic, morphing the body—lengthening the legs, 
defining the calves, lifting the butt—as radically as it is possible to do without surgery.  ‘One thing I detest . . . is 
[2] 
 
 
So what’s so special about the conditional proprietization of yet another hue?  In granting 
Louboutin dominion over the red sole, the Second Circuit underlined the “industry” in the 
fashion industry.  Rejecting the district court’s condemnation of Louboutin’s attempt to rob other 
designer-artists of the ability to express themselves and compete with his products through red,
9
 
the Second Circuit determined that shoes as a useful product whose functionality is not 
necessarily enhanced through sole color.  Louboutin’s red soles, the circuit held, serve to refer to 
Louboutin himself, regardless of whatever primary, artistic meaning they contain.
10
 
This case note argues that by holding that the red soles’ secondary meaning trumps their 
primary meaning, the Second Circuit created space for the soles to take on tertiary meaning.  The 
act of contrast that the Second Circuit wrote into the very definition of the red sole mark can now 
be reintegrated into the pool of possibilities other designers may use—we can imagine, for 
example, mugs with red bases, nails with red undersides, cupcakes with red centers.
11
  Shoes 
with soles of other contrasting colors have already been suggested to Louboutin
12
 and made 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
when a shoe is too soft, . . . molding to the foot,’ Louboutin said. ‘This is quite disgusting.’”); that high heels help 
you appreciate scenery: 
Louboutin . . . is not sympathetic to complaints about the deleterious effects of 
high heels on locomotion.  He told me a story about a client who, having bought 
her first pair of his heels, was forced to slacken the pace of her morning walk.  
“She began to notice the little details of her neighborhood for the first time,” he 
said, proudly. 
Lauren Collins, Sole Mate:  Christian Louboutin and the psychology of shoes, NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/03/28/110328fa_fact_collins?currentPage=all.  To see how these ideas 
are made manifest in Louboutin’s shoes, see infra app. at Figure 2. 
8 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228. 
9 See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp.2d 445, 454–55 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
10 See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 225–27. 
11 The manicure and cupcake already exist; see infra app. at  
 
Figure 3. 
12 See Collins, supra note 7 (“The one thing Louboutin does not tweak is the color of the sole, even though charities 
are always hounding him to do a pink one for National Breast Cancer Awareness Month, or a green one for Earth 
Day. Shawna Rose [(famed publicist and Louboutin’s director of communications for the Americas)] told me, ‘I 
don’t even torture him with it anymore.’”). 
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reality by others.
13
  Thanks to the careful framing of the Second Circuit, the contrasting bottom 
has become quotable, which increases its Benthamian utility
14
 and fosters Aristotelian human 
flourishing,
15
 while still respecting the maker’s rights of Lockean theory16 and the Hegelian 
emphasis on personhood.
17
  In other words, the decision is a fashion-forward compromise 
between the competing concerns that underlie intellectual property (“IP”) protections. 
Part II of this note fills in the background against which the Second Circuit decided the 
fate of the red soles, first by detailing some of the peculiarities of the fashion industry that have 
made it a difficult match for IP law and then by setting forth the legal background of the single-
color trademark.  Part III explores the Louboutin case itself, concentrating on the different 
approaches of the district and circuit courts and the significance of these differences.  Part IV 
explores the potential created by the Second Circuit’s decision and argues that trademark 
protection in fashion can, as it does in this case, encourage cultural production rather than curb it. 
II. Background 
A.  The Fashion Industry & the Law 
Graphic designer and blogger Dyske Suematsu has observed that, “[a]lthough the skills 
required to create the work are quite similar, the internal processes of so-called ‘fine arts’ and 
‘commercial arts’ are fundamentally different. . . .  What drives most fine artists is their urge to 
say something[;] what drives most commercial artists is their urge to be heard.”18  Suematsu 
                                                            
13 See ROSSO SOLINI:  DESIGNER SOLES, http://www.rossosolinishop.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013) (selling stick-
on soles in a variety of colors and prints). 
14 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 11–19 
(2012). 
15 See id. at 200–03. 
16 See id. at 191–97. 
17 See id. at 197–99. 
18 Dyske Suematsu, What Makes Art “Fine” or “Commercial”?, DYSKE: CULTURAL CRITIQUE (Aug. 7, 2010) 
http://dyske.com/paper/933 (emphasis in original).    
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suggests that this distinction sets unfiltered self-expression at one pole and reception-driven 
production at the other, with most art falling somewhere along the spectrum between the poles.
19
   
Fashion is a prime example of the need for artistic compromise in light of the practical 
concerns of a commercial world.  Even schools that require uniforms have had to acknowledge 
fashion as a prized means of self-expression;
20
 the Metropolitan Museum’s Costume Institute 
showcases “five continents and seven centuries of fashionable dress.”21 Artistry is not enough, 
however—as any fan of Project Runway knows, if you fail as a designer to strike a successful 
balance between artistry and salability, “you’re out.”22  Indeed, “Fashion = Art + Commerce.”23   
The commercial aspect of fashion distinguishes it from—and, to some, may make it 
“lesser” than—a fine art, where beauty need not bow to functionality, where expression remains 
unfettered, and where the final form of the artistic product is determined by the artist, not by 
differences among human figures or by the vagaries of the wearers’ accessory choices.24  At the 
                                                            
19 See id. 
20 See Stephanie Clifford, A Little Give in the Dress Code, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/business/school-dress-codes-letting-a-little-style-slip-
in.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
21 THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/museum-
departments/curatorial-departments/the-costume-institute (last visited Mar. 5, 2013). 
22 “You’re out” is the catchphrase with which host Heidi Klum dismisses eliminated contestants each week.  Project 
Runway (Bravo 2004–08; Lifetime Television, 2009–present).  As an example of the show’s frequent discussions of 
the need to balance creativity with retail potential, series judge Michael Kors told one contestant who had strayed 
too much toward the experimental, “I understand a non-traditional wedding.  But I don’t care if you’re getting 
married in Winesberg in a loft, you’re not wearing that.”  Louis Virtel, Happy Birthday, Michael Kors! Here are His 
9 Best ‘Project Runway’ Putdowns, AFTERELTON, (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.afterelton.com/people/2012/08/9-
best-michael-kors-project-runway-jokes?page=1,1 (quoting Project Runway: “Model” Clients (Bravo television 
broadcast Jan. 12, 2005)). 
23 This was the title of the 2012 symposium presented by Fordham University School of Law’s Fashion Law 
Institute.  See FASHION LAW INSTITUTE, http://fashionlawinstitute.com/institute-events/fashion-art-commerce, (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2013); see also Joy Sewing, “Project Runway” Judge Zac Posen Talks Fashion, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 
30, 2012), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/Project-Runway-judge-Zac-Posen-talks-fashion-
4150043.php (presenting comments by the designer on fashion as an industry as well as a creative process).  
24 Kant, for example, in creating a hierarchy of the beautiful arts—a hierarchy that did not include fashion design — 
prized forms that allow the communication of the artist’s idea(s) along with sensations of pleasure.  See IMMANUEL 
KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, part I, § 52, 214 (J. H. Bernard trans., 2d ed. 1914), available at 
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1217/0318_Bk.pdf  (“[I]n all beautiful art the essential thing is the form, which is 
purposive as regards our observation and [judgment], where the pleasure is at the same time cultivation and disposes 
the spirit to Ideas, and consequently makes it susceptible of still more pleasure and entertainment.”).  Interestingly, 
[5] 
 
 
same time, however, fashion’s commercial aspect is a source of credibility and cultural 
prominence—should a skeptic deride fashion choices as frivolous like Anne Hathaway’s 
character in The Devil Wears Prada, Meryl Streep’s Miranda Priestly has a compelling retort: 
You go to your closet and you select... I don’t know... that lumpy 
blue sweater, for instance because you’re trying to tell the world 
that you take yourself too seriously to care about what you put on 
your back.  But what you don’t know is that that sweater is not just 
blue, it’s not turquoise.  It’s not lapis.  It’s actually cerulean.  And 
you’re also blithely unaware of the fact that, in 2002, Oscar de la 
Renta did a collection of cerulean gowns.  And then I think it was 
Yves Saint Laurent... wasn’t it who showed cerulean military 
jackets? . . . And then cerulean quickly showed up in the 
collections of eight different designers.  And then it . . . filtered 
down through the department stores and then trickled on down into 
some tragic Casual Corner where you, no doubt, fished it out of 
some clearance bin.  However, that blue represents millions of 
dollars and countless jobs and it’s sort of comical how you think 
that you’ve made a choice that exempts you from the fashion 
industry when, in fact, you’re wearing the sweater that was 
selected for you by the people in this room from a pile of stuff.
25
 
 
It is difficult to disagree with this logic—fashion is a $350 billion-a-year industry,26 with “annual 
U.S. sales of more than $200 billion—larger than those of books, movies, and music 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Kant does include “the art of tasteful dressing (with rings, snuff-boxes, etc.)” as an analog to painting in his 
taxonomy of the arts, another indication that the final disposition is key.  Id. at part I, § 51, 211.   
 Susan Scafidi has noted—and condemned—a similarly dismissive attitude toward fashion among lawyers: 
Two dress forms grace the entrance of Fordham University Law professor Susan 
Scafidi’s new ground-floor office.  One is hugged by a lavender RM by Roland 
Mouret moon dress, and the other wears a pink knockoff by the—perhaps 
ironically named—label Rare. “It’s no accident that I put pink dresses on there,” 
Scafidi says, gesturing to the dress forms.  “Fashion is a pink-and-lavender 
discipline.  It’s associated with women and gay men, and there is an ongoing 
perception that this is a lighthearted subject.  It can be, but the legal issues are 
every bit as complicated and hard to crack as in any other field.”  
Shakthi Jothianandan, Fordham’s New Fashion Law Institute Will Serve, Protect, Talk Shoes, THE CUT (Aug. 11, 
2010, 2:10 PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2010/08/fashion_law_institute.html; see also C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie 
Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2009) (noting that the law treats 
fashion design as different from literature, music, and art). 
25 Memorable quotes for The Devil Wears Prada, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0458352/quotes (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2013) (quoting THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (Twentieth Century Fox 2006)). 
26 Lynsey Blackmon, Comment, The Devil Wears Prado:  A Look at the Design Piracy Prohibition Act and the 
Extension of Copyright Protection to the World of Fashion, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 107, 11 (2007) (citing Design Piracy 
Prohibition Act:  Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Jeffrey Banks, a fashion designer)). 
[6] 
 
 
combined.”27  Indeed, “fashion is an industry of major economic, environmental and cultural 
significance [that has] been significant to the industrial and economic development of a number 
of countries . . . [and] has also played a significant role in the global relations between nations.”28 
 Despite the fashion industry’s financial and social importance, however, fashion design 
has largely fallen by the legal wayside in the United States.
29
  Scholars and industry insiders are 
starting to call attention to this neglect—and to call for a change:  Fordham’s Fashion Law 
Institute, directed by Professor Susan Scafidi, opened its doors in late 2010;
30
 The New York 
City Bar’s new Fashion Committee was created in 2011;31 the new and improved iteration of 
fashion-friendly legislation originally penned in 2006 began to make the Congressional rounds in 
2012.
32
  If passed, this legislation will come over eighty years after Learned Hand presaged its 
necessity, when he announced that no law protected designers:   
It seems a lame answer in such a case to turn the injured party out 
of court . . . .  Congress might see its way to create some sort of 
temporary right, or it might not.  Its decision would certainly be 
preceded by some examination of the result upon the other 
                                                            
27 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 24, at 1148. 
28 JOANNE ENTWISTLE, THE FASHIONED BODY:  FASHION, DRESS AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY 208 (2000) 
(emphasis in the original). 
29 See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 24, at 1150. 
30 See Jothianandan, supra note 24   
(Scafidi is the director of Fordham University’s new Fashion Law Institute, the 
first of its kind, which officially launches September 8. The Institute, supported 
in part by the Council of Fashion Designers of America, will be the primary 
nerve center for the academic study of fashion-related legal issues; it'll also offer 
pro bono legal counseling to designers in need. “Fashion law is a new academic 
field and it’s new to even call it ‘fashion law,’ never mind to even conceive of it 
as a whole,” says Scafidi.) 
31 See City Bar Creates New Committee on Fashion Law, NEW YORK CITY BAR (Jan 10., 2011, 2:09 PM), 
http://www.nycbar.org/component/wordpress/2011/01/10/city-bar-creates-new-committee-on-fashion-
law/?option=com_wordpress&Itemid=299 (“The New York City Bar Association has announced the creation of a 
new committee on Fashion Law, which will study and comment on a wide range of legal issues associated with the 
fashion industry.”). 
32 See Susan Scafidi, Fashion PROTECTION Week: New "fashion copyright" bill (IDPA); red sole relief; and a new 
design manifesto, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Sept. 10, 2012), http://counterfeitchic.com/2012/09/fashion-protection-week-
new-fashion-copyright-bill-idpa-red-sole-relief-and-a-new-design-manifesto.html (“In the U.S. Congress today, 
Senator Chuck Schumer introduced the newest version of the fashion design protection legislation originally 
proposed in 2006 and currently pending in the House of Representatives. . . .   Happily the title isn’t such a mouthful 
this time; the IDPPPA is now simply the IDPA, the “Innovative Design Protection Act.”).  
[7] 
 
 
interests affected.  Whether these would prove paramount we have 
no means of saying; it is not for us to decide.
33
  
It is surprising that an industry of such economic prominence has only recently begun to 
garner concerted legal attention.  It is even more surprising that fashion in particular has lacked 
protection when it seems so fundamentally akin to IP.  As Barton Beebe has noted,  
Sumptuary law
[34] 
did not disappear with industrialization and 
democratization, as is generally believed.  Rather, it has taken on a 
new . . . form:  intellectual property law.  To be sure, the express 
purpose and primary effect of intellectual property law remains the 
prevention of misappropriation and the promotion of technological 
and cultural progress.  But for various reasons, we are increasingly 
investing intellectual property law with, and forcing the law to 
adapt to, a new purpose.  This purpose is to preserve and stabilize 
our modern sumptuary code in the face of emerging social and 
technological conditions that threaten its viability . . . . We are thus 
increasingly relying on intellectual property law not so much to 
enforce social hierarchy as simply to conserve . . . our system of 
consumption-based social distinction and the social structures and 
norms based upon it.
35
 
 
If IP is the modern means of protecting consumption-derived status, it should be fashion’s soul 
mate—after all, “apparel oft proclaims the man,”36 and “fashions are not distinctive because they 
are beautiful; they are beautiful because they are distinctive.”37 Seeming harmony of purpose 
notwithstanding, fashion does not enjoy easy access to intellectual property protection.   
“The term ‘intellectual property,’ conventionally understood, includes, on a federal level, 
utility and design patents and copyrights, on a federal and state level, trademark and trade dress 
protection.”38  The United States Copyright Office distinguishes among the three as follows:   
                                                            
33 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929). 
34 “A statute, ordinance, or regulation that limits the expenditures that people can make for personal gratification or 
ostentatious display.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (9th ed. 2009). 
35 Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2010). 
36 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3. 
37 Beebe, supra note 35, at 865–66. 
38 Charles E. Colman, An Overview of Intellectual Property Issues Relevant to the Fashion Industry, in NAVIGATING 
FASHION LAW:  LEADING LAWYERS ON EXPLORING THE TRENDS, CASES, AND STRATEGIES OF FASHION LAW 
(Aspatore 2012), 2012 WL 167352 at *1, 1.  Colman also notes that there are several forms of state-level protection 
for intellectual property, such as “trade secret protection, the right of publicity, the right against misappropriation, 
[8] 
 
 
Copyright protects original works of authorship, while a patent 
protects inventions or discoveries.  Ideas and discoveries are not 
protected by the copyright law, although the way in which they are 
expressed may be.  A trademark protects words, phrases, symbols, 
or designs identifying the source of the goods or services of one 
party and distinguishing them from those of others.39  
 
Fashion arguably encompasses inventions (the zipper, for example), original works (such as a 
design, like that of the foldable Longchamp bags) and trademarks (e.g. embroidered alligator 
logos).  All three main varieties of legal protection for intellectual property could thus protect 
fashion designers, at least in theory.  In practice, because of the idiosyncrasies of the fashion 
industry, none of these three has provided the designs that deck the runways and drive the 
industry the legal protection that many feel they both deserve and require.
40
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and other causes of action that vary by state.”  Id.  These peripheral protections, however, vary greatly and do not 
offer much protection to fashion designs. see id. at *56–57. 
39 COPYRIGHT, http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-general.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).  But see Wendy J. 
Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617–46 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet 
eds., 2003) (suggesting that the demarcations among these three protections are not quite so tidy and that there is 
potential for slippage among them). 
40 Not all scholars believe that protecting fashion designs through intellectual property law is desirable.  First, there 
are those who resist intellectual property protections in general, or who would at least seek to limit them.  See, e.g., 
GNU OPERATING SYSTEM, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (“Proprietary software 
developers use copyright to take away the users’ freedom; we use copyright to guarantee their freedom. That’s why 
we reverse the name, changing ‘copyright’ into ‘copyleft.’”); Carrie McLaren, Copyrights and Copywrongs:  An 
Interview with Siva Vaidhyanathan, STAY FREE! (Fall 2002) http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/archives/index.html 
(presenting interviewee’s distinction between intellectual “property,” which he defines as a “government-granted 
monopoly” from real property and noting that “copyright is not natural, it’s something that we the people decided to 
give to a certain class of people in exchange for something”); Martin Skladany, Alienation by Copyright:  
Abolishing Copyright to Spur Individual Creativity, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 361, 392 (2008) (“The death of 
copyright would hopefully dampen the over-consumption of commercial art and encourage people to resist 
ossification of their personalities by creating art on their own.  More critically, we would be building a democracy of 
people who do, rather than people who sample.”); FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ®, 
http://www.freedomofexpression.us/trademark.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (featuring Kembrew McLeod’s 
explanation of how he trademarked the expression “Freedom of Expression:” 
In my application to the Patent and Trademark Office, I didn’t write: “I want to 
trademark ‘freedom of expression’ as an ironic comment that demonstrates how 
our culture has become commodified and privately owned.”  I simply applied to 
register this trademark and let the government decide whether or not we should 
live in a world where someone can legally control freedom of expression®.  In 
filing this application, I crossed the enemy line at the Patent and Trademark 
Office, feigning allegiance by speaking their slippery language of legalese, 
fooling them into saying what I hoped wasn’t actually possible.). 
Joining these voices of generalized discomfort with intellectual property rights are those who feel that 
fashion, in particular, benefits from the relatively low level of IP protections.  While Kal Raustiala and Christopher 
Sprigman do not go so far as to claim that the fashion industry would collapse “in a high-IP environment,” they do 
[9] 
 
 
 Before turning to the three IP protections and assessing their relative in/compatibility 
with the fashion industry, it is important to stress the difference between copying and 
counterfeiting.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines the verb “counterfeit” as “[t]o unlawfully 
forge, copy, or imitate and item . . . or to possess such an item without authorization and with the 
intent to deceive or defraud by presenting the item as genuine.”41  The dictionary notes that 
“[c]ounterfeiting includes producing or selling an item that displays a reproduction of a genuine 
trademark, usually to deceive buyers into thinking they are purchasing genuine merchandise.”42  
Counterfeiting is criminalized by the United States Code, which provides that “[w]hoever 
intentionally . . . traffics in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in 
connection with such goods or services,” is fined, “if an individual, . . . not more than $2,000,000 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
argue that “a regime of low IP protection, by permitting extensive and free copying, enables emerging trends to 
develop and diffuse rapidly, and, as a result of the positionality of fashion, to die rapidly.”  Kal Raustiala & 
Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:  Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 1687, 1733–34.  Thus, Raustiala and Sprigman assert, “[m]ore fashion goods are consumed in a low-IP world 
than would be consumed in a world of high IP protection precisely because copying rapidly reduces the status 
premium conveyed by new apparel and accessory designs, leading status-seekers to renew the hunt for the next new 
thing.”  Id. at 1733.  In this way, low IP protection can stimulate innovation rather than stifle it.  See id. at 1688.  
Ann Bartow also argues against IP protection for fashion, which “depriv[es] poor and penny-pinching people of 
noncounterfeit knockoffs.”  Ann Bartow, Counterfeits, Copying and Class, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 707, 747 (2011).  
Bartow suggests that the alleged fear of consumer confusion is just a smokescreen for trying to use the law to avoid 
“the effects of legitimate competition based on attributes such as price, quality, consumer appeal and retail 
availability.”  Id. at 707. 
But see Blackmon, supra note 26, at 159 (expressing hope for a future offering greater IP protection to the 
fashion industry and in which “fashion designers will for once be respected and recognized, like those before them, 
for their creative contributions to our society.”); Whitney Potter, Comment, Intellectual Property’s Fashion Faux 
Pas:  A Critical Look at the Lack of Protection Afforded Apparel Design under the Current Legal Regime, 16 
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 69, 89 (2011) (“The arguments against design protection have stood for too long upon too 
weak a foundation.  Once the underlying justifications for these arguments are explored, such as the allegedly 
unbreakable link between innovation and piracy, their futility becomes apparent and their damaging effects 
undeniable.”); Alexandra Manfredi, Note, Haute Copyright:  Tailoring Copyright Protection to High-Profile 
Fashion Designs, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 152 (2012) (“Although introduction of a new intellectual 
property protection may inspire an increase in anticompetitive behavior and could have some negative implications, 
the benefits of this proposed provision would likely outweigh its drawbacks.”); Kevin V. Tu, Counterfeit Fashion:  
The Interplay between Copyright and Trademark Law in Original Fashion Designs and Designer Knockoffs, 18 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 419, 448–49 (2010) (arguing that increased protection for fashion IP has been made 
necessary by technological changes through which “designs can now be purloined and placed in competition with 
the original almost instantly,” a phenomenon that disincentivizes innovation and thus threatens the forward 
movement of the industry). 
41 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 402 (9th ed. 2009). 
42  Id. at 402–03. 
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or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, and, if a person other than an individual, shall be 
fined not more than $5,000,000.”43  The statute also subjects repeat offenders to increased 
sentences.
44
  There is thus considerable legal recourse for designers who are the victims of actual 
counterfeiting.  Less clear is what protects designers from imitation that threatens the 
marketability of their designs without directly trying to mislead the market via counterfeiting. 
One main source of protection for any creator who can fix their design in a tangible 
medium is the United States Copyright Act.
45
  Copyright is a long-lived but not permanent 
protection—for the typical “work created on or after January 1, 1978, [copyright] subsists from 
its creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the 
author’s death.”46  Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary defines copyright as  
[a] bundle of exclusive rights granted to the author of a creative 
work such as book, movie, song, painting, photograph, design, 
computer software, or architecture.  These rights include the right 
to make copies, authorize others to make copies, make derivative 
works, sell and market the work, and perform the work.  Any one 
of these rights can be sold or licensed separately through transfers 
of copyright ownership. Copyright rights are acquired 
automatically once the work is fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression. Registration of the work with the Copyright Office 
offers additional benefits to the copyright owner.
47
  
 
Among these “additional benefits” is the capacity to enforce your copyright— although 
“registration is voluntary” and “[c]opyright exists from the moment the work is created[, y]ou 
will have to register . . . if you wish to bring a lawsuit for infringement of a U.S. work.
48
 
“Copyright . . . protects original works of authorship including literary, dramatic, musical, and 
                                                            
43 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2013). 
44  Id. 
45 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2013). 
46 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2013). 
47 NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY, http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/copyright-term.html (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2013). 
48 COPYRIGHT, supra note 39. 
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artistic works, such as poetry, novels, movies, songs, computer software, and architecture. 
Copyright does not protect facts, ideas, systems, or methods of operation, although it may protect 
the way these things are expressed.”49  Copyright protects even unintentional copying, so “it is 
sometimes said that civil copyright is a ‘strict liability’ offense.”50 
 Given the scope of copyright protection, fashion design—the tangible representation of a 
designer’s vision—would seem to be an excellent match for this form of legal protection.  In 
reality, however, fashion designs are often unable to overcome the hurdles that items must clear 
to secure copyright protection.  Charles E. Colman ranks copyright’s anti-utility requirement as 
the bar most likely to preclude copyright protection for fashion:  “Because the Copyright Act 
excludes ‘useful articles’ from federally copyrightable subject matter, 17 U.S.C. § 101, 
clothing—‘useful’ insofar as it covers the body for reasons of warmth or social norms—
generally receives no protection under copyright law.”51  Another bar to copyright protection that 
is particularly relevant to the fashion industry is the so-called “idea/expression dichotomy”:  “in 
the visual arts, including fashion, ‘it is not clear that there is any real distinction between the idea 
in a work of art and its expression [because an] artist’s idea, among other things, is to depict a 
subject in a particular way.”52  Although lobbyists are trying to change copyright law to gain 
more protection for fashion design,
53
 copyright does not currently offer designers much recourse. 
                                                            
49 COPYRIGHT, supra note 39. 
50 Colman, Overview of IP Issues, supra note 38, at *3.  Colman cautions against the “strict liability” descriptor, 
however, as potentially misleading.  See id. 
51 Id.  The doctrine of separability does allow certain “useless” adornments or features of a garment to be 
copyrighted where the work as a whole cannot; such features include “fabric patters of sufficient originality; images 
affixed to garments; some embroidery, beading and lace; some sculptural components of fashion; original jewelry; 
and certain elements of ‘fanciful’ costumes.” Id. at *4. 
52 Id. at *11 (quoting Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
53 For a discussion of the proposed legislation, see Alexandra Manfredi, supra note 40, at 139–50. 
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Nor does patent law
54
 afford designers much in the way of protection.  “Patents, 
exclusively a creature of federal law, come in two varieties that are relevant [to the fashion 
industry]:  utility patents, which protect previously undiscovered utilitarian processes and 
devices; and design patents, which protect non-functional, original, ornamental designs for 
manufactured articles.”55  Utility patents protect inventions for twenty years from the date on 
which the patent application is filed; design patents protect inventions for fourteen years from the 
grant of the patent.
 56
  Both varieties of patents require fees, though utility patents are more costly 
than design patents.
57
  It can take quite a while to obtain either kind of patent.
58
   
The timing of patents is a major obstacle for the fast-moving fashion industry.  As Oscar 
Wilde once wrote, “[W]hat is a fashion?   From the artistic point of view, it is usually a form of 
ugliness so intolerable that we have to alter it every six months.”59  So ephemeral are fashion 
trends that, in many cases, the item for which a patent were sought would be moot before the 
USPTO would decide whether to grant the patent.
60
  Patent law also poses other hurdles that 
make it a dubious match for most fashion design.  For both varieties of patent,
61
 the invention 
                                                            
54 Title 35 of the U.S. Code is devoted to patent law.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2013). 
55 Colman, Overview of IP Issues, supra note 38, at *17. 
56 See THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/patents.jsp (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
57 See id. 
58 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) acknowledges the time delay involved in obtaining a 
patent by offering utility patents applied for since June 8, 1995, the greater of 20 years from the application or 17 
years from the grant.  See id. 
59 Oscar Wilde, Literary and Other Notes, WOMEN’S WORLD (Nov. 1887), available at: 
ftp://ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/1/4/2/4/14240/14240.txt. 
60 See Potter, supra note 40, at 76.  As a result of the industry’s speed, Charles E. Colman notes, “design patents 
tend to be clustered in areas of the fashion industry where products change relatively slowly, such [as] the footwear, 
sportswear, and accessory segments of the market.”  Colman, supra note 38, at *22. 
61 The two types of patents are explicitly linked in the text of 35 U.S.C. § 171, the design patent provision:  
“Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. . . . The provisions of this title relating to patents for 
inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.” 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2013).  Thus, in 
addition to directly requiring newness and originality, which echo the newness, novelty and non-obviousness 
required for utility patents, the other utility patent requirements are implicated through cross reference. 
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must be “new and useful,”62 and demonstrate “novelty;”63 its innovation, moreover, must not 
have been “obvious.”64  These requirements are a tall order for an industry of limited 
possibilities; as Vera Wang has noted, “We’re dealing with the human body.  You can lower the 
waistline down to your kneecaps or raise it all the way up to your neck, but unless a woman 
grows another leg or another arm or two heads, we’re still working within a certain structure.”65  
Consequently, “[n]othing has never been done before.”66  Patent law, like copyright, is too rigid 
to keep pace with the fleet and supple fashion industry. 
The last of the IP triumvirate, trademark law,
67
 is “the most flexible, sharpest little 
dagger” in the armory of the fashion lawyer.68  Trademark offers renewable protection in ten-
year increments;
69
 “trademark protection is [thus] potentially perpetual in duration.”70  “At a 
fundamental level, trademarks serve to indicate the source of goods and services,”71 with the 
twofold goal of incentivizing innovation by prohibiting free riding and of preventing consumer 
confusion.
72
  This second aim leads courts to ask, “‘[H]ow close is too close?’”73  The manner in 
which a court will go about answering this question will vary, because “[e]ach federal circuit has 
                                                            
62 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013). 
63 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2013). 
64 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2013) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to 
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”). 
65 Venessa Lau, Can I Borrow That?  When designer “inspiration” jumps the fence to full-on derivation, the critics’ 
claws pop out, W Mag. (Feb. 2008), 
http://www.wmagazine.com/fashion/2008/02/fashion_derivations?currentPage=4 (quoting Wang). 
66 Id.  Vera Wang thus evokes with respect to fashion what Harold Bloom has dubbed “the anxiety of influence” in 
his literary analysis.  See HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE:  A THEORY OF POETRY 96 (2d ed. 1997) 
(“A poem is a poet’s melancholy at his lack of priority.” (emphasis in original)). 
67 Federal trademark protection is granted by the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2013). 
68 Susan Scafidi, Director, Fashion L. Inst. at Fordham Univ. Sch. of L., Address at the Fashion Inst. of Tech.:  
Technology Trap: Fashion, Copying, and the Speed of Information (Mar. 6, 2013). 
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2013). 
70 Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
71 Colman, Overview of IP Issues, supra note38, at *25. 
72 See id. 
73 Id. at 26. 
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developed its own ‘likelihood of confusion’ factors.”74  Thus, although grounded in federal 
statute, trademark law has been shaped by the courts.   
Trademarks can take many forms.  Charles E. Colman’s classification includes:  words; 
generic marks; descriptive marks; suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks; names and personas; 
full names; pictoral or design marks; sound and smell marks; color marks.
75
  In the next section, 
we will focus on color trademarks and, more specifically, single-color trademarks.  As Colman 
has observed, “color is its own animal in the trademark realm[, and n]aturally color trademarks 
are of particular interest to the fashion industry, where visual impact is of the utmost 
importance.”76 When we later turn to the following section, which discusses the Louboutin case 
itself, we will see how the Second Circuit tailored trademark law to suit fashion.  
B.  Single-Color Trademarks 
 
 In 1995 the Supreme Court asked “whether the [Lanham Act] permits the registration of a 
trademark that consists, purely and simply of a color.”77  Qualitex Company, a manufacturer of 
dry-cleaning press pads, had decked its pads in “a special shade of green-gold” for nearly forty 
years when rival Jacobson Products began to sell its own pads, “color[ing] those pads in a similar 
green gold.”78  Would trademark law allow Qualitex to prevent Jacobson from using the color?   
 The Court began to answer this question by looking to the language of the Lanham Act 
and finding no indication that color is excluded from “the universe of things that can qualify as a 
                                                            
74 Id.  Thus, trademark depends greatly on common law in practice, though its theory is codified as federal law. 
75 See id. at *30–42.  Colman’s lucid and helpful discussion provides an excellent overview of the law for those 
seeking more information on trademarks. 
76 Id. at 41 (emphasis in original). 
77 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 160–61 (1995).  “The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq., 
was enacted by Congress in 1946.”  LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2013).  Nolo’s defines the Lanham Act as “[t]he federal statute that governs trademarks, 
service marks, and unfair competition.  The Lanham Act covers matters that include the procedures for federally 
registering trademarks, when owners of trademarks may be entitled to federal judicial protection against 
infringement, and other guidelines and remedies for trademark owners.”  NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY, 
http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/lanham-act-term.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
78 Id. at 161. 
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trademark.”79  Perusing the roster of registered marks, the Court found startling heterogeneity 
and asked:  “If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as symbols why . . . can a color not do 
the same?”80  Although color is “unlike ‘fanciful,’ ‘arbitrary,’ or ‘suggestive’ words or designs, 
which almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand,”81 the Court observed, a 
color can nevertheless “come to signify and distinguish the goods [it is used to mark] . . .  much 
in the way that descriptive words on a product . . . can come to indicate a products origin.”82  
Noting that “[i]t is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color, 
shape, fragrance, word or sign—that permits it to serve [the] basic purposes [of trademark 
law],”83 the Court found no “reason to disqualify absolutely the use of color as a mark.”84 
 Finding no absolute bar to using color as a mark does not lead inexorably to upholding a 
single-color trademark, however.  Notably, the would-be color mark needs (1) to have “attained 
‘secondary meaning’”85 and (2) to not have a function upon which competition is based.86  Thus, 
the Court “conclude[d,] . . . sometimes, a color will meet ordinary legal trademark requirements.  
And, when it does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone from serving as a trademark.”87  
Applying its test to the Qualitex pads, the Court found the color to be a valid mark:  
The green-gold color acts as a symbol.  Having developed 
secondary meaning (for customers identified the green-gold color 
as Qualitex’s), it identifies the pads’ source.  And, the green-gold 
color serves no other function.  (Although it is important to use 
some color on the press pads to avoid noticeable stains, the 
[district] court found no competitive need in the press pad industry 
for the green-gold color, since other colors are equally usable).
88
 
                                                            
79 Id. at 162. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 162 (citation omitted). 
82 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (citations omitted). 
83 Id. at 164 (citation omitted). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 163. 
86 See id. at 164–65. 
87 Id. at 161. 
88 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
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This two-part test for single-color trademarks remains good law.
89
   
The first prong, “secondary meaning,” is difficult to satisfy on a practical level—it 
requires time and effort to build referentiality—but simple in theory—whether that meaning has 
been created is an empirical question, at least for color-based trademarks.
90
  To determine 
whether a mark has attained secondary, or source-identifying meaning, “certain evidentiary 
factors are appropriate to consider:  (1) the length and manner of its use, (2) the nature and extent 
of advertising and promotion of the mark, and (3) the efforts made to promote a conscious 
connection, in the public’s mind, between that mark and a single source.”91  This is a fact-
intensive inquiry, and the weight given to particular facts will vary from industry to industry.
92
 
Whereas the existence of secondary meaning is fairly straightforward, the second prong 
of the Qualitex test poses quite a theoretical conundrum—what does “functional” mean?  The 
green-gold of the Qualitex pads served to mask stains but was not “functional” because other 
colors could serve the same purpose.
93
  Because the green-gold was not functional, it could be 
protected.
94
  Now, suppose the green-gold was used on a hunting jacket.  In this context, the 
same color could not be protected because it would function to camouflage the hunter.  To grant 
one producer an exclusive right to that color would be tantamount to granting that producer a 
monopoly on hunting-jackets—competitors would be forced to use non-camouflaging colors, a 
major disadvantage.
95
  “The functionality doctrine . . . forbids the use of a product’s feature as a 
                                                            
89 See Charles E. Colman, A Red-Leather Year for Aesthetic Functionality, 4 LANDSLIDE 26, 27 (2011). 
90 Secondary meaning is a more complex inquiry with respect to word-based trademarks.  Laura Heymann observes 
that trademark doctine favors image marks over linguistic marks because the former are more obviously referential.  
See Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1330–32 (2010).   
91 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 3 CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMP., TR. & MONO. § 20:29 (4th ed. 2012). 
92 See id. 
93 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166. 
94 See id. 
95 This is the reasoning the Federal Circuit used in holding that, because the color black makes outboard boat 
engines compatible with a variety of boat colors and also makes the engine appear smaller, black is a functional and 
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trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature 
is essential to the use or purpose of the article or affects its cost or quality.”96 
 But what happens in a field like fashion, where competition turns not on the actual 
function of the items offered—most shirts, for example, will cover the body and provide shirt-
level warmth—but on their aesthetic appeal?  This problem was envisioned back in 1938: 
The trademark law doctrine of “aesthetic functionality” has a . . . 
humble origin . . . —the blandly named “Comment a” in § 742 of 
the Restatement of Torts, which explained:  “When goods are 
bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be 
functional because they definitely contribute to that value and thus 
aid the performance of an object for which the goods are 
intended.”  From this seed grew the gnarled tree now known as 
“aesthetic functionality.”97 
 
As presented in this form, aesthetic functionality does not seem so complicated:  in markets in 
which competition stems not from actual functionality, but rather from aesthetics, than the 
aesthetic value of an object essentially becomes part of that object’s function.  As a result, 
trademark protection would not extend to features that contribute to the item’s aesthetic appeal.  
In Qualitex, however, the Supreme Court reformulated the doctrine of aesthetic functionality: 
[I]f a design’s “aesthetic value” lies in its ability to “confe[r] a 
significant benefit that cannot be duplicated by the use of 
alternative designs,” then the design is “functional.”  The “ultimate 
test of aesthetic functionality, [therefore,] . . . is whether the 
recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder 
competition.
98
 
 
This formulation is both more obscure and, potentially, more supple than the original version of 
the doctrine.  Whereas the original first asks whether the item is purchased for its aesthetics or its 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
non-protectable via trademark in that context.  See Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1533 
(Fed. Cir. 1994). 
96 Id. at 169 (quotations omitted). 
97 Colman, Red-Leather Year, supra note 89, at 27. 
98 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1993)). 
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function (such that dry cleaning pads, bought for their function, survive the test, but fashionable 
items, bought for their attractiveness, might not), the Qualitex version first asks whether the 
item’s appearance creates a significant benefit.  Thus, if it is the green-gold of the Qualitex dry 
cleaning pads that served to make them desirable, then the green-gold would not be protectable. 
 No one would accuse the Qualitex test for aesthetic functionality of being easy to apply.  
Indeed, “[t]he status of the aesthetic functionality doctrine is not clear,” and the circuits have not 
applied this doctrine in the same way.
99
  As we turn now to the Louboutin saga, we will see how 
the Second Circuit approaches the question of functionality and whether colors can ever be 
anything other than functional in a field in which appearance is everything. 
III. Louboutin’s Red Soles 
 Louboutin painted his first sole red in 1992.
100
  As Lauren Collins tells the story,  
Louboutin had thought of making a shoe inspired by Andy 
Warhol’s “Flowers.” The prototype, a pink stacked heel with a 
cartoonish cloth blossom, had arrived from Italy. “I was very 
happy, because it was similar to the drawing,” Louboutin recalled, 
“but the drawing still was stronger and I could not understand 
why.” Louboutin continued, “There was this big black sole, and 
then, thank God, there was this girl painting her nails at the time.” 
Louboutin grabbed the nail polish—it was red—from the assistant 
and slathered it on the sole of the prototype. “Then it popped,” he 
recalled, “and I thought, This is the drawing!”101  
 
Louboutin has colored his soles red ever since that fateful day.  The red soles no longer serve to 
evoke Warhol; rather, they have taken on their own meaning:  “I selected the color because it is 
engaging, flirtatious, memorable, and the color of passion,” Louboutin has affirmed.102  In 
addition to their seductive virtues, the red soles are clever from a business perspective:  “Part of 
                                                            
99 MALLA POLLACK, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO TRADEMARK LAW § 4:18 (2012). 
100 See Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (reprinting the 
passage from Louboutin’s certificate of registration for his trademark, which lists the date of first use as 1992). 
101 Collins, supra note 7 (emphasis in original).  See also infra app. at Figure 4. 
102 Id. 
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the genius of the red sole is that it is beautiful.  The other part is that it requires a lot of 
refreshing:  Louboutins, which look horrible scuffed, start to depreciate the day you walk them 
off the lot.”103  Yet, though he acknowledges red’s connation of passion, and though the fragility 
of the colored sole keeps customers coming in for refreshments and replacements at a lucrative 
clip, Louboutin also asserts that “[t]he shiny red color of the soles has no function other than to 
identify to the public that they are mine.”104  Accordingly, Louboutin argued, his red soles are a 
valid mark upon which Yves Saint Laurent (“YSL”) infringed when it released an all-red shoe.105 
 Judge Marrero, in an opinion for which he is likely to be infamous for some time,
106
 
relied on the somewhat enigmatic doctrine of aesthetic functionality to hold that the expressive 
potential inherent in the red sole trumped its secondary meaning (“these are Louboutins”): 
Because in the fashion industry color serves ornamental and 
aesthetic functions vital to robust competition, the Court finds that 
Louboutin is unlikely to be able to prove that its red outsole brand 
is entitled to trademark protection, even if it has gained enough 
public recognition in the market to acquire secondary meaning.
107
 
 
While the Supreme Court did uphold a single-color marks in Qualitex,
108
 Marrero notes, 
“whatever commercial purposes may support extending trademark protection to a single color for 
industrial goods do not easily fit the unique characteristics and needs . . . that define production 
                                                            
103 Id.  See also infra app. at Figure 5. 
104 Id. 
105 See Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
106 Marrero’s opinion has been noted for its flair as frequently as for its faulty analysis.  Charles E. Colman called it 
“unusually flowery,”  Colman, Overview of IP Issues, supra note 38, at *42; an IP blogger referred to Marrero’s 
“lengthy and somewhat overly-zealous reasoning,” Annsley Merelle Ward, Letter from AmeriKat: Tiffany is Blue 
for Louboutin’s Red, THE IPKAT (Nov. 14, 2011, 3:39 AM), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2011/11/letter-from-
amerikat-tiffany-sees-blue.html; Afigo I. Fadahunsi was more descriptive, noting that the  
wittily-penned opinion surprised even the more ardent literary canon enthusiasts 
among us.  Equating the whims of fashion with the brushstrokes of Picasso, 
quoting the likes of Walt Whitman’s “Leaves of Grass” and Jennifer Lopez’s 
“Louboutin,” Judge Marrero sought to underscore the notion that fashion has a 
dependence on color as an “indispens[a]ble medium.” 
 Afigo I. Fadahunsi, Monochromatic Victory:  Designers Eee Red amid Sole Trademark Ruling, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 3, 
2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b692c4ea-0626-41ef-b061-33f511cf6c3b.  
107 Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d. at 449. 
108 See supra, Part II.B. 
[20] 
 
 
of articles of fashion.”109  To Marrero, the difference between the industries makes them 
incomparable—after all, “industrial models [do not] sashay[] down the runways in displays of 
the designs and shades of the season’s collections of wall insulation.”110  
 Marrero argues that fashion is more appropriately analogized to painting, “[b]ecause both 
find common ground and goals in two vital fields of human endeavor, art and commerce.”111  In 
both domains, “the whole spectrum of light serves as a primal ingredient without which neither 
painting nor fashion design as expressive and ornamental art would flourish.”112  Just as we 
would not want Picasso to be able to preclude Monet from painting water the same shade of blue 
that Picasso used,
113
 Marrero reasons, trademark “law should not countenance restraints that 
would interfere with creativity and stifle competition by one designer, while granting another a 
monopoly invested with the right to exclude use of an ornamental or functional medium 
necessary for freest and most productive artistic expression by all engaged in the same 
enterprise.”114  This is precisely what upholding the red sole mark would produce, Marrero fears: 
[A]t any moment when the market and the deities of design, by 
whatever fancy the decide those things, proclaim that “passion” is 
in for a given season and must be expressed in reds in the year’s 
various collections, Louboutin’s claim would cast a red cloud over 
the whole industry, cramping what other designers could do, while 
allowing Louboutin to paint with a full palette.
115
 
 
Accordingly, Judge Marrero denied Louboutin’s request for an injunction.116 
                                                            
109 Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d. at 451. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 452. 
112 Id. 
113 See id. at 451. 
114 Id. at 453. 
115 Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
116  Judge Marrero’s reasoning largely echoes Wendy Gordon: 
When the age of modem copyright first arrived, a painter was free to depict what 
came before; her exercising that liberty should not close it off from others who 
come after her.  A painter in the modem city should be as able as the cave 
painter to depict and interpret her surroundings, even if in the modem world 
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 Judge Marrero did correctly perceive that Louboutin’s registration certificate was 
overbroad:  it claimed the lacquered red sole as a trademark when placed on “women’s high 
fashion designer footwear.”117  A trademark of such vague contours would take many shades of 
red off the sole market for anything that could be argued to be “high fashion designer 
footwear.”118  Both the Second Circuit, as we will see below, and the Cour de cassation, France’s 
highest court, agree that, as described in his registration certificate, Louboutin’s mark is 
overbroad.
119
  In what is perhaps a case of jurisprudence imitating art, however, Judge Marrero 
framed the question he was addressing much more broadly than he should have, such that his 
decision ended created per se rule against single-color trademarks in fashion: 
The narrow
120
 question presented here is whether the Lanham Act 
extends protection to a trademark composed of a single color used 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
many of the things she sees are artifacts created by others. That a first creator 
has labored is not sufficient ground to justify giving her a right to keep others 
from achieving their proper goals. 
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1534, 1558 (1993).  Whereas Gordon links painting to depiction of reality, 
however, Marrero makes no such claim for shoe design.  Marrero prefaces his Louboutin-Picasso analogy by 
declaring that he intends to “[p]ut[] aside the thousand technicalities lawyers would conjure and quibble about in 
arguing why the imagined case is inapposite or distinguishable from the real controversy before the Court. . . .”  
Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 451–52.  The different aims of painters and designers, however, would seem to 
necessitate regarding the means they require to achieve their aims differently, and to complicate the seamless 
transfer of Gordon’s logic to the world of fashion design, regardless of the District Court’s disclaimer. 
117 Id. at 448–49. 
118 See id. at 454–57. 
119 For information on the French court’s decision, see Lucy Waterlow & Hannah Roberts, Louboutin Loses Case to 
Stop Zara Selling Red-Soled Shoes, MAILONLINE (June 11, 2012, 5:47 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2157558/Christian-Louboutin-loses-case-stop-high-street-store-Zara-
selling-red-soled-shoes.html.   The Cour de cassation’s decision is interesting because France is known for being the 
country that offers the most protection to designers.  The United States, on the other hand, is known for being the 
least protective of fashion IP, yet, discussed below, the Second Circuit rewrote Louboutin’s registration for him to 
make it valid, rather than simply declare it unenforceable.  Credit for information on the relative levels of protection 
offered to fashion IP in different countries to Te Smith, MarkMonitor, Address at the Fashion Inst. of Tech.:  
Technology Trap: Fashion, Copying, and the Speed of Information (Mar. 6, 2013).  Louboutin’s trademark 
registration is reproduced infra.  See infra app. at 
 
Figure 6. 
120 As Tiffany (NJ) LLC pointed out in its amicus brief, “the forgoing [sic] is not a ‘narrow question’ but a broad 
one, and was not necessary or appropriate to ask or answer in resolving the preliminary injunction motion.”  Brief 
for Tiffany (NJ) LLC and Tiffany and Company in Support of Appellants’ Appeal Seeking Reversal of the District 
Court’s Decision Denying Appellants’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Louboutin S.A. v. Saint Laurent Am. 
Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2012) (No. 11-3303), 2011 WL 5126167, at *6. 
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as an expressive and defining quality of an article of wear 
produced in the fashion industry. In other words, the Court must 
decide whether there is something unique about the fashion world 
that militates against extending trademark protection to a single 
color, although such registrations have sometimes been upheld in 
other industries.
121
 
 
This sweeping question led to an equally sweeping YES:  “the Court cannot conceive that the 
Lanham Act could serve as the source of the broad spectrum of absurdities that would follow 
recognition of a trademark for the use of a single color for fashion items.”122  Thus, encapsulated 
in Judge Marrero’s decision is an argument for excluding fashion from the trademark protection 
that other industries enjoy, even though it cannot secure the copyright protection from which 
other, less “useful” artistic media, benefit.123  Through his focus on the functional potential of 
appealing elements, moreover, Judge Marrero brought the difficult doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality to the Second Circuit’s door.124 
 The Second Circuit did not leave the fashion industry betwixt and between.  Rather, it 
reined in the scope of the issue and of Louboutin’s trademark.  Although the circuit court did not 
engage in the sort of cultural critique the district court practiced, it did nevertheless contribute to 
culture by taking action—the Second Circuit took its blue pencil to Louboutin’s red soles and 
defined them in a way that makes them both protectable and more meaningful. 
 The Second Circuit took a methodical approach from the outset: 
We address the District Court’s order in three parts.  We first 
consider whether a single color is protectable as a trademark, both 
generally and in the specific context of the fashion industry.  We 
then address the doctrine of “aesthetic functionality” and consider 
whether, as the District Court held, a single-color mark is 
necessarily “functional” in the context of the fashion industry—
with the result that no such mark could ever be trademarked in that 
                                                            
121 Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 451. 
122 Id. at 457. 
123 See supra Part I.A. 
124 See Colman, Red-Leather Year, supra note 89, at 28–29. 
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industry.  Finally, we determine whether the Red Sole Mark is a 
valid trademark entitled to the protection of the Lanham Act.
125
 
 
In answering the first question, the Second Circuit stressed the consumer-protective purpose of 
trademark law and noted that, although this protection has the benefit of entailing protection of 
for the producer, “it is not intended to protect innovation by giving the innovator a monopoly 
over a useful product feature.”126  The Second Circuit stressed that “[s]uch a monopoly is the 
realm of patent law or copyright law, which seek to encourage innovation, and not of trademark 
law, which seeks to preserve a vigorously competitive market for the benefit of consumers.”127   
  Despite this caveat, the court noted, a mark merits protection if it is distinctive, either 
inherently or by having acquired secondary meaning.
128
  When a mark is distinctive, it is 
enforceable against those competitors whose products feature marks so similar that thy might 
create consumer confusion—unless, that is, the competitor can show that the mark is functional 
on either a utilitarian or an aesthetic level.
129
  The Second Circuit described “the test for aesthetic 
functionality [as] threefold:  At the start, we . . . ask[] whether [(1)] the design feature is either 
essential to the use or purpose or [(2)] affects the cost or quality of the product at issue.”130  If the 
answer to either of these is “yes,” then the inquiry ends and trademark protection is denied.  If, 
on the other hand, the answer to both is “no,” then (3) the mark must still “be shown not to have 
a significant effect on competition in order to receive trademark protection.”131 
 Having set forth the contours of the usual test for trademark validity and the affirmative 
defense of aesthetic functionality, the Second Circuit turned to the question of whether there was 
                                                            
125 Louboutin, S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 215 (2d Cir. 2012). 
126 Id. at 216 (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted). 
127 Id. (quotation omitted).  But see Colman, Overview of IP Issues, supra note 38, at *25 (naming the incentivizing 
of producer investment as the first of trademark law’s two aims). 
128 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 216. 
129 Id. at 217. 
130 Id. at 220. 
131 Id. 
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anything special about the use of single-color trademarks in the fashion industry that would 
require modifying the test.  Noting that the test for aesthetic functionality is necessarily fact-
intensive
132
 and that “the Supreme Court specifically forbade the implementation of a per se rule 
that would deny protection for the use of a single color as a trademark in a particular industrial 
context,”133 the Second Circuit “determined that no per se rule governs the protection of single-
color marks in the fashion industry, any more than it can do so in any other industry.”134   
Accordingly, the Second Circuit began its analysis of Louboutin’s trademark case by 
asking whether the red sole was distinctive enough to merit protection.  The court observed that 
“a single color, standing alone, can almost never be inherently distinctive,”135  but found that the 
red soles to be distinctive by virtue of the secondary meaning they have acquired:  “Louboutin’s 
marketing efforts have created [a]brand with worldwide recognition. . . .  By placing the color 
red in a context that seems unusual and deliberately tying that color to his product, Louboutin 
has created an identifying mark firmly associated with his brand which, to those in the know, 
instantly denotes his shoes’ source.”136  The Second Circuit noted, however, that Louboutin’s red 
soles only carry secondary meaning in certain circumstances: 
We conclude, based upon the record before us, that Louboutin has 
not established secondary meaning in an application of a red sole 
to a red shoe, but only where the red sole contrasts with the 
“upper” of the shoe.  The use of a red lacquer on the outsole of a 
red shoe of the same color is not a use of the Red Sole Mark.
137
 
 
The Second Circuit therefore rewrote Louboutin’s trademark in keeping with the contrast the 
court found to be a central element of his soles’ significance:  “We . . . instruct the Director of 
                                                            
132 See id. at 222. 
133 Id. at 223. 
134 Louboutin, S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 2012). 
135 Id. at 225. 
136 Id. at 227. 
137 Id. at 228. 
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the Patent and Trade Office to limit the registration of the Red Sole Mark to only those situations 
in which the red lacquered outsole contrasts in color with the adjoining ‘upper’ of the shoe.”138   
The Second Circuit’s decision was win-win for the parties involved:  Louboutin’s red 
sole mark is protected, and Saint Laurent’s monochromatic red shoe marches forward.139   The 
fashion industry also won big:  although it remains unclear how the circuit will address questions 
of functionality in aesthetic elements going forward, it is now evident that aesthetic trademarks 
in fashion will at least get the benefit of a fact-intensive inquiry into their validity.  Susan Scafidi 
applauded the Second Circuit’s decision, celebrating the fact that “the district court’s 
overreaching attempt to ban all single-color trademarks in fashion was tossed out like a bad 
impulse purchase.  One small sigh of relief for a man, one giant sigh of relief for the fashion 
community.   Now we can all put up our red soles and rest.”140   
The biggest victory in the Second Circuit’s decision was arguably the court’s 
modification of Louboutin’s trademark.  This is, first and foremost, a triumph of common sense:  
the circuit court could simply have invalidated the mark for overbreadth as the Cour de cassation 
did in Louboutin’s Hexagon-based battle,141 a harsh result that would ill reward the effort 
Louboutin has expended in promoting his brand through his red sole mark.
142
  The modification 
                                                            
138 Id. 
139  See id. at 228–29.  The Second Circuit stressed that, because YSL’s monochrome shoe did not run afoul of 
Louboutin’s trademark, it was not going to opine any matters exceeding the scope of its holding:  “it is axiomatic 
that we need not—and should not—address either the likelihood of consumer confusion or whether the modified 
Mark is functional.”  Id. at 229. 
140 Scafidi, Fashion PROTECTION Week, supra note 32. 
141 See Waterlow & Roberts, supra note 119. 
142 Like an adverse possessor who gains title to real property, Louboutin earned his red sole mark.  He openly used 
red on his soles, and even added “hostililty” to his possession through litigation.  Although Judge Marrero ultimately 
denied Louboutin trademark protection, he did openly recognize Louboutin’s innovation:  “ Louboutin . . . departed 
from longstanding conventions and norms of his industry, transforming the staid black or beige bottom of a shoe 
into a red brand with worldwide recognition at the high end of women’s wear, a product visually so eccentric and 
striking that it is easily perceived and remembered.”  Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 
2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  It is not until after the red soles gained fame and became associated with Louboutin 
that many other designers suddenly took interest in red outsoles.  To allow them to use red soles now that Louboutin 
has made them special would be to condone free riding.  By allowing Louboutin to take “ownership” of contrasting 
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is also important because, by defining the soles as deriving meaning through contrast, the Second 
Circuit made contrast an element of the red sole mark.  Contrast may always have made the mark 
stand out, but making it an explicit feature of the mark is significant:  like a filter in a search 
engine, this additional definitional element makes the red soles easier to identify—and to invoke.  
The next section focuses on why increased invocative potential is a win for culture in general. 
IV. Analysis 
 
Karl Lagerfeld once said that “[f]ashion is a language that creates itself in clothes to 
interpret reality.”143  Design elements and garments are like letters and words, and it is perhaps 
easier to understand the perils and potential of trademark protection in the fashion world through 
this fashion-as-language concept.  If the fashion industry is a conversation between designers and 
consumers, the goal—regardless of whose philosophy of property and society we apply—is to 
encourage the discussion to range over many topics and to include as many voices as possible.   
The question is thus whether protection such as Louboutin’s trademark stimulates the 
conversation or stifles it.  Did the Second Circuit’s decision partially gag designers who might 
choose to express themselves via red soles, by taking away something akin to the letter “O,” like 
James Thurber’s pirates?144  This note argues that, while the Second Circuit certainly did take an 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
red outsoles, the court sends a clear message to designers:  if you want to preserve your right to use similar elements, 
do not let secondary meaning build unchecked.  Jeffrey J. Look  has warned that this need for vigilance has been 
made more acute for secondary meaning that can be built via the internet:  
The creators of copyrightable works, as well as trademark owners, will need to 
exercise vigilance in patrolling the Internet for infringers and will need to act 
quickly to stop the activity. If not, they risk losing their right to control the 
manner by which their intellectual works are distributed, used and displayed. 
This is not unlike the real property concept of adverse possession.   
Jeffrey J. Look, The Virtual Wild, Wild West (Www): Intellectual Property Issues in Cyberspace:  Trademarks, 
Service Marks, Copyrights, and Domain Names, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 49, 89 (1999).  
143 Quoted at GOODREADS, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/fashion?page=4 (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  
144 See JAMES THURBER, THE WONDERFUL  “O” (1957).  The residents of the island upon which the pirates embark 
lament the loss of “o” and the related deprivations they will suffer:  “‘They will take my dough,’ moaned the baker.  
‘They will take my gold,’ moaned the goldsmith.  ‘And my forge,’ sighed the blacksmith.  ‘And my cloth,’ wept the 
tailor.  ‘And my chocolate,’ muttered the candymaker.”  Id. at 17.  The key difference between the villagers in the 
story and the other designers who may no longer use red lacquered soles on their high-fashion women’s shoes is that 
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expressive option off the table, as if it had removed a tile from the Scrabble board of fashion,
145
 
it framed its decision in such a way as to create third level of meaning—“tertiary meaning,” or 
the meaning that can be attached to a brand name, such as the safety that many suburbanites 
equate with Volvos
146—to join the secondary meaning that secured Louboutin’s red sole mark.   
This tertiary meaning can come from without—when other designers refer to and reframe 
the protected design—as well as from within, when companies adopt social aims so that their 
brand markers signify these goals as well.  Thus, although upholding Louboutin’s mark protected 
his ability to benefit from his maker’s rights in a Lockean sense147 and the artistic expression of 
his person in a Hegelian sense,
148
 the increased potential for communication through tertiary 
meaning maximizes—via a spillover effect identified by Brett M. Frischmann and Mark A. 
Lemley
149—both Benthamian utility150 (by multiplying available choices and thus allowing 
participants to compare options and make selections offering the most favorable pleasure-to-pain 
ratio) and Aristotelian human flourishing
151
 (by multiplying available choices and thus allowing 
participants to develop “autonomy, practical reason, and sociability”).  This is the very sort of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
designers will be able to play with the idea of the contrasting sole (as in by soles of other colors) and the contrasting 
use of red (as in the red underside of a handbag), and these design elements will have additional meaning by dint of 
referencing Louboutin’s red sole mark. 
145 Marc R. Poirier, Remarks at Paper Conference (Mar. 14, 2013). 
146 For information on Volvo safety, see MOTORING, http://motoring.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=8613032 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2013) (“It’s official: Volvo has built the world’s safest car. And it doesn’t just protect drivers.”).  
For amusing evidence of Volvo’s reputation as the vehicle-of-choice for suburbanites, see infra app. at Figure 7. 
147 See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 14, at 191–93. 
148 Id. at 197–99. 
149 In the words of the authors:  
Spillovers—uncompensated benefits that one person’s activity provides to 
another-are everywhere.  My decision to plant an attractive flower bed benefits my 
neighbors and people who happen to stroll by.  Your decision to educate your 
children well, making them into productive, taxpaying, law-abiding members of 
society, benefits the people who buy the goods they will produce, the people who 
will receive the government benefits their taxes fund, and the people they might 
otherwise have robbed. 
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258 (2007). 
150 Id. at 12–13, 203. 
151 Id. at 202. 
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balanced solution that Wendy J. Gordon advocates as a means to protect the creator from 
“stowaways” while still adhering to the Lockean proviso of “enough and as good.”152 
It is nothing new to suggest that the clothes and accessories in which we dress ourselves 
have the ability to communicate.  In fact, it is precisely because such choices are meaningful that 
people are able to make what are commonly called “fashion statements.”  In making a fashion 
statement, however, it is the wearers of clothes who have chosen both the message and the means 
of communicating that message, not the fashion designers.
153
  Roland Barthes similarly 
emphasized the split that exists between a tangible fashion item and the message attributed to it.  
He noted that every piece of clothing featured in a magazine is actually three garments:   
The first is the one presented to me as photographed or drawn—it 
is image-clothing.  The second is the same garment, but described, 
transformed into language; this same dress, photographed on the 
right, becomes on the left:  a leather belt, with a rose stuck in it, 
worn above the waist, on a soft Shetland dress; this is a written 
garment. . . .  [T]hese two garments recover a single identity at the 
level of the real garment they are supposed to represent.
154
 
 
Thus, the inherent “semiotic nature” of fashion design—that is, of the “real garment” in 
Barthes’s analysis—is expanded and accentuated by the photographic and verbal representations 
of the garment, such that “[f]ashion becomes narrative.”155  It is important to note that, in 
Barthes’s conception of how fashion acquires meaning, there must first be translation—the 
intermediary known as a “shifter,” to use Barthes’s term—among these three garments.156   
                                                            
152 See Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 116, at 1572–76. 
153 See supra note 24 (discussing Kant’s inclusion of artful dressing—but not fashion design—within his hierarchy 
of the arts). 
154 ROLAND BARTHES, THE FASHION SYSTEM 3–4 (Matthew Ward & Richard Howard trans., University of 
California Press 1990).  Barthes, of course, goes on to complicate the notion of identity among the “three garments,” 
but his theories of the production of meaning and the interplay between fashion producers and the fashion press is 
beyond the scope of the present study.  For the purposes of this note, the essential kernel of Barthes’s analysis is that 
mediation is required between fashion feature and meaning, whereas trademark within fashion is able to exist on the 
linguistic and the vestimentary planes at the same time. 
155 Id. at 277. 
156 See id. at 5–7. 
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 C. Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk focus on the manner in which designers communicate 
through the fashions they create, arguing that “[i]nnovation in fashion creates vocabularies for 
self-expression that relate individuals to social worlds.”157  They note that, “[a]s a means of 
signaling and communicating about oneself, and of perceiving messages about others, dress has a 
symbolic function and is even considered by some social theorist to be a code or a language that 
provides visual cues and signifiers of identity, personality, values, or other social meanings.”158  
Hemphill and Suk assert that this communicative, quasi-linguistic capacity of fashion design 
frequently leads designers to communicate by “remixing”159 statements made by their creative 
peers and predecessors.  Citing Chanel jackets and quilted purses as designs to which designers 
frequently allude, Hemphill and Suk liken such referencing to forms of musical allusion, 
“homage and pastiche.”160  They assert that 
designers . . . may engage in interpretation or ‘referencing.’  They 
may quote, comment upon, and refer to prior work.  Unlike much 
close copying, such interpretation does not pass off the work as the 
work that is being copied.  Instead, it marks awareness of the 
difference between the two works as it looks to the prior work as a 
source of influence, or even a precursor.  Even where the influence is 
not completely conscious or direct, the latter work draws on the 
meaning of the earlier work, rather than being simply a copy of it.
161
  
 
Hemphill and Suk clearly support creative remixing as an outlet of expression, a means of 
imparting meaning, and even a process that can drive fashion forward.
162
   
Hemphill and Suk thus argue that design elements can take on the same role in shaping 
the language of fashion that verbal trademarks hold with respect to language itself.  One of the 
                                                            
157 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 24, at 1151. 
158 Id. at 1158. 
159 Id. at 1154. 
160 See id. 
161 Id. at 1160. 
162 See id. at 1161.  This is the same right of reference that Wendy J. Gordon argues must be conserved; indeed, 
Gordon suggests that a cause of action for infringement could include an element of intent that would allow courts to 
penalize intellectual “stowaways” while allowing culture to progress through creative recombination and 
referencing.  See Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 116, at 1576–78. 
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most common marks is the single word (e.g. Fendi®, Armani®, Crocs®).
163
  Single-word 
trademarks have proven quite adept at capturing the public interest and infiltrating daily speech.  
Once they enter the idiom, trademarked words both submit to and spark metamorphoses—they 
are converted into various forms of speech at the whim of the speaker, on the one hand, and they 
oust older yet perfectly serviceable words on the other, changing the linguistic landscape forever.  
Recognizing the linguistic importance of trademarks, Professor Laura A. Heymann notes that: 
We use “Coke” to refer to the Coca-Cola beverage in the North, 
and “coke” to refer to any kind of soda in the South, yet we still 
manage to get the drinks we desire. We use trademarks as verbs—
we “xerox” a document or “tivo” a television program—without 
losing sight of the fact that “Xerox” and “TiVo” are brands of 
particular products. We use trademarks as metaphor and as slang—
“Kleenex,” for example, has been used as street language for 
ecstasy. . . .
164
  
 
Indeed, single-word marks are so common and can exert such strong effects on language that one 
can forget they are trademarks (e.g. jet ski, bubble wrap, onesies).
165
  In we might call linguistic 
Darwinism, brand names sometimes prove stronger and survive longer than generic terms. 
Although Hemphill and Suk encourage design Darwinism through reference and 
preference, they are careful to distinguish referencing from copying,
166
 which they say “threatens 
                                                            
163 See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/index.jsp (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2013) (“A trademark is a brand name.  A trademark or service mark includes any word, name, symbol, 
device, or any combination, used or intended to be used to identify and distinguish the goods/services of one seller 
or provider from those of others, and to indicate the source of the goods/services.”).  
164 Heymann, supra note 90, at 1313.  Heymann argues that courts should recognize the trend to incorporate 
trademarked words into daily speech and should be less restrictive in determining what types of words can serve as 
trademarks.  Id. (“[T]rademark law might benefit from a more direct consideration of its role in creating language—
in other words, whether it should be prescriptive (and define proper word usage) or descriptive (and reflect common 
word usage.”).  Such suppleness would alleviate what Heymann argues to be the nonsensical burdens placed on 
single-word trademark holders that do not wish to lose proprietary rights to their trademarked terms to not only 
refrain from using their own trademarked words in creative ways, but to actively combat such playful usage by the 
public.  See id. at 1326–27 (decrying the perceived need for trademark holders to educate the public about how to 
use their verbal trademark “in order to prevent a slide into generic status”).  This paper argues that a similar balance 
can be struck between creativity and brand protection with respect to single-color trademarks in the fashion industry. 
165 See Lauren Harrell, 25 Words You Might Not Know are Trademarked, MENTAL_FLOSS (July 14, 2011, 8:42 
AM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/28238/25-words-you-might-not-know-are-trademarked; see also Lauren Harrell, 
10 More Trademarked Words, MENTAL_FLOSS (Aug. 5, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/28439/10-
more-trademarked-words. 
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the amount of innovation and pulls the direction of innovation toward fashion’s status conferral 
aspects an away from its expressive agents.”167  Of course, the line between clever allusion and 
copy is not necessarily a bright one.  Notably, remixers and their “mixees” may disagree on 
whether a reference constitutes a knowing wink or a theft:
168
  fashion designers may be as 
willing as any to take their place on the shoulders of giants,
169
 but the giants do not always want 
them there, nor do fashion critics.  After a show by Marc Jacobs, for example, one critic 
lamented his “remixing” of other designers:   
Most disappointing was that Jacobs spent a significant amount of 
time merely repeating or paraphrasing what designers such as 
Kawakubo, Margiela and the Dutch team of Viktor & Rolf have 
already said aesthetically. . . .  Jacobs’s greatest gift is his unique 
voice, his ability to create clothes that rise out of his interest in 
popular culture—from animation to music. This collection seemed 
to emerge from the pages of other designers’ old sketchbooks.170  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
166 As the backlash Derek Lam faced for a collection in which he felt that he referenced the work of another 
designer, but that critics felt was merely copying, the distinction between play, which Hemphill and Suk praise, and 
plunder, which they condemn, is not always easy to draw.  See infra note 174 and accompanying text.  This paper 
argues that granting IP protection to fashion helps to make this line easier to draw.  See infra note 182 and 
accompanying text. 
167 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 24, at 1170.  An example they give of how copying distorts innovation is by 
encouraging designers such as Gucci to cover their products in their protectable logos.  “Such ‘logofication’ affects 
the communicative vocabulary that fashion provides, pulling fashion toward a status-conferring function and away 
from the communication of diverse messages.”  Id. at 1178. 
168 And this difficulty is assuming deliberate reference or imitation; as Wendy J. Gordon points out, a certain level of 
similitude with respect to prior works is unavoidable, and no designer could—or should—seek compensation for 
every contribution his designs make to fashion.  After discussing the positives that can flow from granting IP 
protection, Gordon admonishes her readers to 
note an important caveat: no one would suggest that IP should internalize all the 
benefits that flow from an intangible.  For example, imagine how odd the world 
would be if a young person had to pay the authors of his textbooks for all the 
benefits that, over a lifetime, the books generated for him. . . .  Among other 
things, IP must be as concerned with the follow-on innovator as with originators. 
In the year 2006, every originator is a borrower as well. 
Gordon, Intellectual Property, supra note 39, at 623.  
169 “Bernard of Chartres used to compare us [(modern thinkers)] to [puny] dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants.  
He pointed out that we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have keener vision or greater 
height, but because we are lifted up and born aloft on their gigantic stature.”  JOHN OF SALISBURY, THE 
METALOGICON: A TWELFTH-CENTURY DEFENSE OF THE VERBAL AND LOGICAL ARTS OF THE TRIVIUM 167 (Daniel 
D. McGarry, trans., University of California Press 1955), available at 
http://en.calameo.com/read/000107044639e1e85b433. 
170 Robin Givhan, In Hip’s Tight Grip, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/12/AR2007091202646.html. 
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Clearly, to Robin Givhan, design elements should not be referenced like elements of pop culture.  
Although this seems like a strange—and strained—line to draw when the fashion industry thrives 
on its popularity, it is not an uncommon sentiment. 
[T]he bashing Jacobs took this season only proves that the critics’ 
love-hate relationship with derivation is an ever[-]swinging 
pendulum.  A designer may be lauded for appropriating one 
season—as happened when Jacobs’s Yves Saint Laurent/Walter 
Albini–inspired fall 2007 collection was nearly universally 
praised—and castigated the next. Over the years, many major 
designers have been so chided.  Calvin Klein was at various times 
chastised for leaning toward Giorgio Armani and Helmut Lang; a 
retailer even termed his fall 1998 show “Comme des Calvin” for 
its strong Japanese motifs.  Klein’s successor, Francisco Costa, has 
taken shots as well, most recently in spring 2007 for a stunning 
resemblance to Lang.
171
  
 
 While many voices in fashion do not distinguish—at least systematically and 
predictably—between referencing and copying, some designers do support “quoting” the work of 
others.  Tom Ford, “often accused of seeing the world through Halston-colored glasses, [has] 
remarked, ‘Nothing made me happier than to see something that I had done copied.… 
Appropriation has always been a trend.’”172  Derek Lam, after being criticized for copying, 
admitted the reference and expressed regret that no one understand what he was trying to do 
through that reference:  “‘Definitely, I was looking at Alaïa,’ he says. . . .  ‘[T]he message I was 
proposing didn’t come across clearly enough.’ As for what tipped the balance from inspiration to 
perceived plagiarism, Lam wonders if he should have provided show notes.”173  
 It seems that Derek Lam was trying to live the dream of self-conscious referencing that 
Hemphill and Suk favor.  For Lam, that dream turned into a publicity nightmare.  If the designs 
he was quoting were protected as intellectual property, however, Lam would have had an easy 
                                                            
171 Lau, supra note 65, at http://www.wmagazine.com/fashion/2008/02/fashion_derivations?currentPage=3. 
172 Id. at http://www.wmagazine.com/fashion/2008/02/fashion_derivations?currentPage=6. 
173 Id. at http://www.wmagazine.com/fashion/2008/02/fashion_derivations?currentPage=4. 
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answer:  he would either have crossed the line and infringed, or walked the line and imbued his 
work with the meaning derived from the designs he referenced.  It is the ambiguity of the 
signified designs’ status that left Lam vulnerable to criticism.174 
The Second Circuit’s Louboutin decision offers such clarity to those who would like to 
refer to his work.  In upholding the red-sole trademark and, especially, in defining it with the 
precision it originally lacked, the Second Circuit made the scope of Louboutin’s message very 
clear.  Because the contrasting red lacquered sole is Louboutin’s, those designers who wish to 
incorporate statements about Louboutin into their works can do so without fear that their designs 
will be interpreted as unoriginal rather than deliberately referential.
175
  This referentiality is a 
third layer of meaning:  if the provocativeness Louboutin sought to capture is the primary 
meaning of his soles, and the fact that the soles say “Louboutin” is their secondary meaning, 
references to Louboutin’s soles would allow designers to graft tertiary meaning upon those 
soles.
176
  While designers may no longer be able to legally create high-heeled women’s pumps 
                                                            
174 While Lam faced what could be  called market abundance confusion—i.e., given the amount of designs displayed 
each year, Lam’s reference to Balenciaga was at once too obvious not to garner criticism for unoriginality and too 
vague to send a clear message via referencing, because the quoted collection apparently did not mean to Lam’s 
critics what it meant to him.  But see Potter, supra note 40, at 70 (expressing the optimistic view that “[t]oday’s 
heightened fashion consciousness has led to a new level of consumer sophistication—specifically, the ability to 
recognize the individual style of their favorite designers without referencing a label or trademark”). 
175 Trademarked designs are powerful signifiers of the brand they protect, as Abercrombie & Fitch acknowledged 
when—whether seriously or in a P.R. ploy is anyone’s guess—it offered to pay a JERSEY SHORE cast member “to 
stop wearing clothes carrying their brand. . . . because the series is ‘contrary to the aspirational nature of the brand.  
We are deeply concerned that Mr. Sorrentino’s association with our brand could cause significant damage to our 
image,’ the retailer said in a press release.”  Mae Anderson, Abercrombie Asks ‘The Situation’ to Shop Elsewhere, 
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/17/abercrombie-asks-the-
situation-to-shop-elsewhere/#ixzz2N0IOjMBb.  Given the powerful referentiality of trademarked designs, it is 
possible to take an element from a trademark and recast it without losing the ability to evoke the original.  Thus, for 
example, now “[t]here is a Louboutin manicure, in which the underside of the nail is painted with scarlet polish.”  
Collins, supra note 127; see also infra app. at  
 
Figure 3. 
176 Although IP law does not use the term “tertiary meaning,” both copyright and trademark law do this level of 
significance.  Thus we have the fair use exception to copyright protection and the parody exception to trademark 
protection, both of which allow for the use of protected material in order to make certain kinds of statements about 
[34] 
 
 
with contrasting red soles, in other words, they have gained the ability to add their own gloss to 
the meaning of “Louboutin” by evoking the soles in meaning-rich ways in their designs.177   
Literature gives us some examples of the kinds of meanings that can be implicitly 
attached to brand markers.  The potential for the creation of multiple levels of meaning via 
design protection was already apparent in 1883, when Émile Zola fictionalized the creation of 
the first department store in Paris and offered a very perceptive account of the massive 
commercial and social impact of the grands-magazins.  Zola’s Au Bonheur des dames begins 
with a long, detailed description of the spell-binding power that the window displays of the new 
retail colossus exert upon the novel’s heroine, Denise, and her family.  After several pages of 
adjective-laden accounts of the diverse wares on offer, Denise arrives at the final display: 
A display of silks, satins, and velvets spread out before them in a supple, 
shimmering range of the most delicate flower tones:  at the top were the 
velvets, of deepest black and as white as curds; lower down were the 
satins, pink and blue, with bright folds fading into infinitely tender 
pallors; lower down still were the silks, all the colours of the rainbow, 
pieces rolled into shell shapes, folded as if round a drawn-in waist, 
brought to life by the knowing hands of the shop assistants; and, 
between each motif, between each coloured phrase of the display, there 
ran a discreet accompaniment, a delicate gathered strand of cream-
coloured foulard.  And in colossal piles at each end were the two silks 
for which the shop held exclusive rights, the Paris-Paradise and the Cuir-
d’Or, exceptional items that were to revolutionize the drapery trade.178 
 
The fabrics mentioned at the end are the only proprietary names in Zola’s long catalog of 
available goods and, after mentioning these names, the lyrical lèche-vitrines
179
 ends and the 
action of the story begins.  Just as the explicit meaning of Zola’s text foreshadows the revolution 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
that material.  See Colman, Overview of IP issues, supra note 38, at *12; Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even 
More Parodic than the Real Thing:  Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 1000–08 (2004).   
177 But see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 677 (1998) (arguing that excessive property rights can lead to the underuse of resources that 
occurs when access to them is blocked by property rights and that “[a] tragedy of the anticommons can occur when 
too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a scarce resource”). 
178 ÉMILE ZOLA, THE LADIES’ PARADISE 5 (Brian Nelson trans., 1995).  
179 The English expression “window shopping” is a poor substitute for the French “window licking,” with its 
connotations of appetite, need, desire and Pavlovian response. 
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produced by the proprietary fabrics, IP functions as both an end and a beginning in within the 
prose of the novel.  By placing protected fabrics at the transition point between charming but 
relatively static description and action-packed, verb-driven narration, Zola symbolically captures 
both the loss of communicative possibilities that those who argue against IP protection lament 
and IP’s ability to drive industry forward that those who advocate IP protection celebrate.180 
 Flashing forward six score years, we come to Sophie Kinsella’s best-selling Shopaholic 
series, an ode to brand-worship.  Kinsella’s works depict even more directly the communicative 
potential of branding.  In the book that launched the series, the eponymous shopping addict, 
Becky Bloomwood, walks through London on her way to work and reflects on her outfit: 
I’m wearing my black skirt from French Connection, and a plain 
white T-shirt from Knickerbox, and a little angora cardigan which 
I got from M&S but looks like it might be Agnès b.  And my new 
square-toed shoes from Hobbs.  Even better, although no one can 
see them, I know that underneath I’m wearing my gorgeous new 
matching knickers and bra with embroidered yellow rosebuds.  
They’re the best bit of my entire outfit.  In fact, I almost wish I 
could be run over so that the world would see them. 
 It’s a habit of mine, itemizing all the clothes I’m 
wearing . . . .  I’ve been doing it for years—ever since I used to read 
Just Seventeen.  Every issue, they’d stop a girl on the street, take a 
picture of her, and list all her clothes. . . .  I used to read those lists 
avidly, and to this day, if I buy something from a shop that’s a bit 
uncool, I cut the label out.  So that if I’m ever stopped in the street, 
I can pretend I don’t know where it’s from.181 
 
In this text, brands stand as unqualified nouns and add their own meaning to Becky’s outfit.  We 
have no idea what Becky’s skirt looks like—is it long or short?  Straight or pleated?  Ruffled?  
Sequined?  Feathered?  Wool?  Cotton?  Linen?  Such visual minutia cannot compete with the 
skirt’s brand affiliation, because it is the brand—not the look—that signifies coolness or lack 
                                                            
180 See supra note 40 for an overview of both anti- and pro-IP scholarship.  See infra pages 37–40 for a discussion of 
how granting trademark protection to Louboutin’s red soles can offer designers—including Louboutin himself—
new communicative possibilities while simultaneously foreclosing another. 
181 SOPHIE KINSELLA, CONFESSIONS OF A SHOPAHOLIC 14 (2003). 
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thereof.  The first meaning of the skirt is whatever aesthetic it conveys; the second is its function 
as a brand identifier; the third meaning, which derives from the second, is “coolness.”  Here, the 
author achieves descriptive economy by underscoring the capacity of brands to serve as signs. 
Literary works are able to build meaning upon fashion brand names by changing the 
medium in which they occur, by exploiting the shift that must occur between real garment and 
written garment, to use Barthes’s terms, to attach an extra layer of significance to the brand.  
Designers can accomplish similar statements but must in some way tweak the proprietary design 
to do so because they operate within the same medium as the original.  One clever young 
designer has found a way to quote Louboutin’s soles without simply copying them.  In 2010, a 
high-school student completed a school project that soon became a business:  she creates colored 
stickers that can be affixed to the soles of shoes.
182
  Although red was the first color offered by 
Rosso Solini, “[t]he product range . . . has now expanded to include over 30 colours and designs 
including a new bridal range.”183  Her stick-on soles are meaning-rich through their 
referentiality.  On their own, the stickers may connote only whim or a desire to adorn; by 
evoking Louboutin the stickers take on an aspirational quality, yet also unmistakably suggest that 
fancy soles are not only for the affluent.  Rosso Solini is thus an outstanding example of tertiary 
meaning created through reference to a protected design element.
184
 
It is culturally fruitful to add another potential layer of meaning to design and to 
encourage designers to both create and comment, such that the conversation of fashion becomes 
                                                            
182 ROSSO SOLINI, supra note 13.  Founder Tara Haughton, seventeen, “has . . . won the Enterprise Award, The 
Kildare Enterprise award[,] the Ulster Bank Business [Achiever]’s Award[,] and the Sean Lemass Enterprise 
[A]ward.”  Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Another example is the Thursday Friday bags—open, canvas sacs bearing pictures of expensive pocketbooks.  
See Thursday Friday, http://www.thufri.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).  Unfortunately, not everyone appreciates the 
statement these bags make; see also infra app. at Figure 8.  See Hermès Sues Thursday Friday for Using Birkin Bag 
Image, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2011, 4:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/31/hermes-sues-
thursday-frid_n_816613.html (“This just in: Hermès has no sense of humor.”). 
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more far-reaching and self-reflexive,
185
 but Professor Frank Pasquale has identified a different, 
and more important potential social function for intellectual property.  Although expressivity is a 
lovely thing, it is a luxury.  But designers whose work is protected have the ability to attach less 
luxurious, more socially imperative meanings to their own works:   
Following the types of ‘green certifications’ offered for 
development projects in [less developed countries], perhaps 
the Copyright Office could condition design protection on 
applicants’ contractors’ meeting certain fair labor standards 
and practices.  A symbol for protected designs could then 
reflect a verified judgment that the designer’s licensee 
respects certain wage and labor standards.  IP protections 
could be combined and leveraged to reflect the social 
values of those concerned about the exploitation of the 
poor, just as they now reflect the social values of those 
concerned about the exploitation of the copied.
186
  
 
If Louboutin subscribed to this view, he could make his red sole a symbol for ethical production 
as well as status.  While there is nothing to indicate that he holds such aims, other luxury 
designers have striven to make their brands socially meaningful.
187
  IP protections can thus serve 
social causes while simultaneously protecting brands.   
                                                            
185 Although adding referentiality to a fashion design may seem as frivolous as adding another ruffle or fringe, it is 
important to remember the analogy between garment and text.  Just as allusions—always an implicit form of 
critique—enrich literary works, so too can they enhance fashion by provoking thought: 
The first modern novel was already a product, even an expression, of negative 
criticism: “Don Quixote” contains a quite explicit critique of the chivalric romance 
and its insufficiency to account for the way real life feels when you get up in the 
morning in 17th-century Spain.  Cervantes dreamed a distorted dream of “Amadis 
of Gaul,” in which the giants had all been turned into windmills—and the novel 
was born.  It’s to this kind of critical impulse that we owe the growth of literature. 
Elif Batuman, From the Critical Impulse, the Growth of Literature, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31. 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/books/review/Batuman-t-web.html?pagewanted=all. Not everyone reads 
Cervantes, but everyone wears clothes; if clothing can inspire people to think beyond the literal—to think more 
analytically—then we risk falling into the same trap as Anne Hathaway’s character in The Devil Wears Prada if we 
dismiss that potential as mere frivolity.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  Indeed, there is no reason to 
distinguish referentiality in fashion from the “geographical  indications, mash-ups, fan fiction, and machinima” that 
Madhavi Sunder lauds as part of the “life that is culturally fulfilling;” as part of the United Nation’s aspirational 
“Knowledge Society.”  Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 314 (2006). 
186 Frank Pasquale, Joining or Changing the Conversation?  Catholic Social Thought and Intellectual Property, 29 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 681, 722 (2011). 
187 Luxury designer Stella McCartney, for example, has taken great pains to equate her brand with responsible 
production.  See Company Statement, STELLA MCCARTNEY, http://www.stellamccartney.com/experience/us/stellas-
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 Professor Pasquale’s suggestion could help combat animal cruelty in addition to 
sweatshop conditions and the systemic exploitation of laborers.  Uggs, for example, are as 
imitated as they are popular.  They are made of shearling.  “Shearling, a lambskin or sheepskin 
pelt . . . is considered by some to be a separate category [from exotic furs].”188  Because 
authentic Uggs are expensive, cheap copies have flooded the market.
189
  Many of the imitations 
do use fur—fur from raccoon dogs.190  In China, these dogs are skinned alive and then tossed 
onto heaps—still alive—to live out the final agonizing hours of their lives with no skin.191  The 
boots made from these animals cost a mere fraction of what authentic Uggs do.
192
  With better 
intellectual property protection for designs, it may be possible to halt this brutal shadow 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
world/sustainability/company-statement/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).  When one sees her products, one knows that 
they were produced in sustainable ways and that they do not contain animal skins or furs.  See id.  Seeing the 
signature chains with which she trims her bags, for example, the first meaning is whatever style the bags convey, the 
second is that the bag is a Stella McCartney bag, the third is that the bag is not made of leather and was made using 
environmentally innocuous methods.  See STELLA MCCARTNEY, http://www.stellamccartney.com/us/stella-
mccartney/women/bags/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); infra app. at Figure 9.  This chain of logic is possible only if 
Stella McCartney’s signature design elements can be protected. 
188 Patrick Range McDonald, West Hollywood’s New Fur Ban Could Be a Model for the Nation. But Opponents Are 
Still Trying to Strike It Down, L.A. WEEKLY, July 26, 2012, http://www.laweekly.com/2012-07-26/news/west-
hollywood-fur-ban-boutique-designer-peta-shearling/. “‘Shearling’ is not sheared wool. A shearling is a yearling 
sheep who has been shorn once. A shearling garment is made from the skin and coat of a sheep or a lamb who was 
shorn shortly before slaughter; the skin is tanned with the wool still on it.”  PETA, 
http://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-clothing/inside-the-wool-industry.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).  
What makes some consumers think of shearling as being different from fur is that the sheep or lamb is killed for its 
meat, not just for its coat.  See, e.g., Eric Wilson, Fuzzy Logic, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2009) 
http://runway.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/fuzzy-logic/ (explaining that shearling is considered akin to leather 
rather than to fur even by PETA). 
189 See, e.g., Linda Mora Lee, Top 5 Fake UGGs Websites:  Were [sic] to Find the Best Knock Offs, YAHOO! VOICES 
(Dec. 10, 2009), http://voices.yahoo.com/top-5-fake-uggs-websites-were-find-best-knock-5041108.html.  This 
citation is not to suggest that the products featured on this site are among those fakes that use raccoon dog fur—I 
have no idea which fakes use the fur and which do not. 
190 See Lydia Warren & Oliver Pickup, Skinned Alive to Make Fake Uggs:  Horrific Footage Reveals Slow, 
Sickening Death of Raccoon Dogs, MailOnline (Oct. 12, 2011, 9:59 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2045016/Raccoon-dogs-skinned-alive-make-cheap-copies-Ugg-boots.html.  For a description and images of the 
raccoon dog, see infra app. at Figure 10. 
191 See id. 
192 See Caroline Grant, Uggly Truth:  Video Shows Raccoon Dogs Being Flayed Alive for the Fur on Fake Trendy 
Boots, THE SUN (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3851468/Uggly-
truth.html#ixzz2N2GM4jWZ.  
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industry.
193
  Through marketing, Uggs could equate its brand with the humane harvesting of 
skins, such that aspiring customers would not only want the look, but also the philosophy.
194
   
 When cultivated to connote social policy—be it labor standards, the humane treatment of 
animals, sustainable production methods, or a company practice of charitable giving—IP law has 
the capacity to give consumers the security of knowing that they are purchasing brands that stand 
for values in which they believe.
195
  This is part of what Madhavi Sunder brilliantly labels the 
New Enlightenment,
196
 and it would implicate the same, third level of meaning upon which 
designers draw when remixing another designer’s protected creation.  IP protection is a 
necessary component in the production of tertiary meaning in fashion:  one cannot bypass the 
brand affiliation of secondary meaning to arrive at either social message or inter-designer 
referentiality directly from the aesthetic connotations of the garment.
197
  By paving the way for 
both more self-conscious artistic innovation on the one hand, and the visual promotion of social 
platforms on the other, the Second Circuit’s Louboutin decision is a step in the right direction.198  
                                                            
193 See Protecting a Billion Dollar Brand, World Intellectual Property Review (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.worldipreview.com/article/protecting-a-billion-dollar-brand (noting that while the company works with 
enforcement agencies to catch and thwart counterfeiting operations, legal protections against imitators are limited). 
194 See Scafidi, WHO OWNS CULTURE, supra note 174, at 132 (“The most successful intellectual properties in 
economic and cultural terms are those in which the public has become the greatest investment.  Such creative works 
become cultural icons . . . .   A community may define itself in terms of an intellectual property . . .  or in opposition 
to an intellectual property.”).  Designers could thus create communities around humanitarian business practices. 
195 This would be an example of philanthropic intellectual property law, which Barton Beebe argues to be the 
desirable evolutionary aim of IP, which will move beyond sumptuary significance as we enter the post-scarcity age.  
See Beebe, supra note 35, at 884–86. 
196 See Sunder, supra note 185, at 319–21. 
197 One would not look at chain trim and think “playful contrast of hard and soft” and then immediately think “pro-
environment and pro-animals.”  This jump in logic is only made possible by associating the design with Stella 
McCartney, who has, in turn, associated her work with social messages.  See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
198 This is arguably “the [super-]idealized vision of intellectual property.”  JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:  
ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 7 (2008).  With respect to “the legal protection of trademarks . . . .  this 
‘homestead law for the English language,”  Id. at 6 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abraham Baldwin 
(Apr. 14, 1802), in 19 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 128–29 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed.) (Washington, D.C.: 
The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 1907), Boyle presents the “idealized vision”—a 
harmonious combination of “sav[ing] consumers time” and  “giv[ing] manufacturers an incentive to make good 
products—or at least to make products of consistent quality or price to build up a good brand name and invest in 
consistency of its key features, knowing that no other firm can take their name or symbol.” Id. at 6–7.  The 
promotion of values through tertiary meaning would thus be beyond even this “idealized vision.”  As Boyle notes, 
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Conclusion 
The Second Circuit reached the right decision in Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent from 
both a legal and a philosophical perspective.  Although the fashion industry largely wants for 
applicable intellectual property law, at present it does have trademark and trade dress 
protections.  The district court improperly treated these protections as dependent on the nature of 
the mark’s primary meaning—functional or functionless—rather than on whether the mark had 
secondary meaning.  The Second Circuit set forth a different test, one that accords more strongly 
with Supreme Court precedent as well as the innovation-incentivizing goal behind IP law:  if a 
mark has acquired secondary meaning, then it is protectable. 
By protecting Louboutin’s red sole as a single-color trademark, the Second Circuit did 
foreclose the use of red soles as a contrast to the uppers of high-heeled women’s shoes by other 
designers.  But, to replace this mode of expression that it restricted, the Second Circuit fashioned 
the possibility of imbuing the soles with tertiary meaning.  The Second Circuit has defined the 
red soles to mean “Louboutin,” which gives other designers the opportunity to quote the soles 
and thus to comment on Louboutin, much like the creator of the Rosso Solini stick-on soles.  It 
simultaneously invited Louboutin to define himself, as Stella McCartney has done.   
To be sure, Louboutin may decline this invitation and stick with the primary, man-bait 
meaning that he originally ascribed to the soles, leaving the interpretive ground that the Second 
Circuit tilled to lie fallow.  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has created fertile space in which 
designers may cultivate social messages.  Though less flashy than the district court opinion, the 
circuit’s decision will be a wardrobe staple for designers and IP lawyers for years to come. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
however, IP protections work differently in different industries.  See id. at p. 4.  Given the very visual nature of 
fashion, its potential for communicating values outstrips that of other industries.  Through IP protection, messages 
can reach a larger audience, because many more people may choose to communicate through red soles or chain trim 
than through the more literal Message Tee, which is suitable for only casual contexts.  See infra app. at Figure 11. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1:  A Rainbow of Proprietary Colors 
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Figure 2:  Some Louboutins Currently Available at Neiman Marcus 
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Figure 3: The Louboutin Manicure & Cupcake 
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Figure 4:  "Poppy" and the First Red Sole 
 
 
Figure 5:  Wear and Tear on the Red Soles 
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Figure 6 : Louboutin’s Trademark Registration 
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Figure 7:  Police Log from Suburbia Heights, in THE PARTY, AFTER YOU LEFT 3 (2004). 
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Figure 8: The Real Birkin Bag & the Referenced Birkin Bag 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 : A Stella McCartney Bag with Chain Trim 
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Figure 10:  The Raccoon Dog 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  Message Tees 
     
